Chain Store Era and the Law by Harrington, J. Ross
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 4 | Issue 8 Article 1
5-1-1929
Chain Store Era and the Law
J. Ross Harrington
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
J. R. Harrington, Chain Store Era and the Law, 4 Notre Dame L. Rev. 491 (1929).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol4/iss8/1
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
A. Monthly LawReview
"Law is the perfedion of human reason"
Volume IV MAY 1929 - Number-S
THE CHAIN STORE ERA AND THE LAW
J. Ross Harrington
The ever increasing complexity of American life has brought
about many new questions. One of the current, most interest-
ing and as yet undecided of these questions is that of the chain
stores. That the question is current is obvious, because this
method of distribution has reached its magnitude of "bigness"
only within the last ten or fifteen years. It is one of the most
interesing questions since it concerns the general welfare of the
entire populace and as well the prosperity and maintenance of
the principles upon which the United States government was
originally founded. The legality of chain store legislation
has as yet to be settled by the United States courts.
There are several cases on record, which we will later
discuss but they offer but little assistance to the final decision
that must be made sometime within the near future.
It has been stated that the chain store situation is current.
However, this may be qualified to a certain degree in that its
origin might-be traced back to 1859. In that year the Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company was founded by George H.
Hartford; the F. W. Woolworth Company was established in
1879; and the B. H. Kroger chain of grocery stores was begun
in 1882.1 At the time of Hartford's death, 1917, he had over
three thousand stores, all combined under the one centralized
management; during the last ten years this number has grown
into a chain of over seventeen thousand, five hundred stores,
covering the entire country from coast to coast, as well as in-
I For a history of the important chain store establishm-ents and thedates of their organization see "Chain Stores." Hayward and White. Mc-
Graw-T-1ill Book Company.
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cluding several foreign continents. Out of every one hundred
grocery stores in this country five are operated by this mam-
moth chain. The growth of the Kroger chain has been ever
more pronounced than that of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Company. During the last year this company has merged with
as many as ten medium-size chains, increasing its number to a
total of five thousand stores. These three chains are singled out
as they are probably the most pretentious chains existing. But
it must not be forgotten that this "ideal" method of distribution.
management and ownership has reached into the far corners of
every conceivable kind of merchandise, including as well, thea-
tres, restaurants, hotels, etc. In the grocery store field alone
there are some 860 companies operating chains comprising over
64,000 units.2
And what is it that has brought about this magnitude and
"bigness" in business? Clark states that the annual volume
of business conducted by the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Com-
pany, 1927, was approximately $750,000,000. Such a stupendous
volume as this surely is "big business" in every sense of the
word, especially when one considers the fact that the average
individual grocery purchase is not ordinarily large. This great
volume is accomplished by the chain apparently selling for a
few cents less than the independent stores.
In the two late issues of Collier's Weeklys, John Flynn.
has written certain articles informing the public in general
how yearly the chains saves them enormous sums of money.
setting forth how the chains bring about this large saving.
Whether or not chain stores enable the consumer to save money
is a question concerning which much may be siaid on both sides.
But it is not the purpose of this article to discuss this question.
The rapidity with which the chains have grown during the
past several years has caused much alarm and discontent among
the independents. The situation has led to the co-operation and
organization of the independents, not solely for the purpose of
co-operative buying, but to instigate and procure of the State
Legislature, bills directly aimed and affecting the chain store
2 Evans Clark, in an article appearing in the New York Times. July
8. 1928, gives a list of the merchandising fields covered by these chains.
Clark lists nearly a hundred thousand units being operated by some four
thousand separate chain organizations.
3 March 30, 1929 and April 27, 1929.
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organizations. These laws have been introduced and carried in
many of the States. In Georgia, every chain having more than
five units was taxed $250.00 per unit. Maryland placed a tax
of $500.00 upon all chains within its jurisdiction. North Caro-
lina placed a tax of $50.00 upon every unit of a chain having over
six stores within its boundaries. During the last Assembly of
the Indiana legislature, a bill was passed whereby every store is
to be taxed a specific sum, and each store over one i s to pay a
higher rate of taxation. The tax rate is graduated similar to the
Income Tax Law-, the larger the number of units operated by
an individual chain, the higher the rate of tax on the stores so
operated by that particular organization. A similar bill was in-
troduced in the Ohio legislature, but it failed to receive final
consideration before the adjournment of that assembly. The-
Ohio bill, in addition to the features mentioned in similar bills,
included a tax upon the yearly volume of business conducted
by the other stores.
A search of the Digest reveals but one of these bills, taxing
the chains, having been declared valid or invalid by the respec-
tive State Supreme Courts. In the case of the Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Company, et al. vs. Doughton, Commissioner of
Revenues of North Carolina, 144 S. E. 701, some ten chains
were joined as co-plaintiffs to recover a fee which they liad paid
as required by the law of that State, which imposed a tax of
$50.00 on each store over six operated and maintained by any
person, firm, corporation or association. The law was passed
as a license tax upon the privilege of doing business within that
State. The court, in' declaring this bill unconstitutional, stated:
"---The store maintained' and operated by the plaintiffs do not
increase fire hazards, no not endangdr the health or. mqrals of
the community in which they are established,--do not require
additional police protection-differ from the stores that are not
required to pay the tax-doing a like or similar business.
"Such is not imposed in the exercise of the police power of
the state-it is imposed in the exercise of the power to levy taxes
solely for revenue purposs. In this case no question of public
policy with reference to chain stores is presented on this record.
-The tax in question was not laid on chain stores per se nor on
the business of operating chain stores."
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It is then concluded by the court that "power to classify is
recognized-but such must not be arbitrary, unreasonable and
unjust.-Any number of chain stores may be operated provided
not more than five under the same rhanagement, supervision or
ownership. Such is an arbitrary distinction and denies equal
protection." A concurring Judge went so far as to declare the
act to be retroactive in that five stores could be operated, but as
soon as the sixth store came into existence, taxes much be paid
on the other five.
It cannot be justly denied that the proper conclusion was
reached by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. No act will
be upheld which is so clearly discriminatory and arbitrary, as
was this particular bill. If it were, it would contravene the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution which inhibited
the States from denying equal protection to persons within its
jurisdiction5 But it is desired to call particular attention to the
fact that the court stated the act was 'not imposed in the exer-
cise of the police power of the State," and that 'no question
of public policy with reference to chain stores" was presented.
Herein the court refused to state its position as to how the chain
stores could be placed under operation of that great state author-
ity so commonly known as Police Power.6 Thus, it remains an
open question in North Carolina whether or not the expansion
and control of retail merchandising could be harnessed under
the poplice power of the State. It appears that this alone is
the proper place for the states to refer for the much needed
authority and right to handle this new and dangerous situation.
Recently, suit was filed in the Federal Court, Indianapolis
District, to test. the validity of the recent exactment placing a
license tax on chain stores in Indiana. This law differs from
that of North Carolina, in that a tax is placed upon each store,
the amount of tax increasing as the number of stores operated
by one company increases. It is to be noted that this act was
passed under the guise of a licensing measure. The complaint
asserts, 'the General Assembly-has no right" to pass such a
"5 Corporations are persons within meaning of this clause to the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Covington, etc.. Road
Co. vs. Sandford. 164 U. S. 592; N'orthwestern, etc,, Insurance Co. vs,
Riggs. 203 U. S. 243.
6 The Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to interfere with the
police power of the States. Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S. 24, 31, 28 L,
Ed. 923, 924.
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measure 'where the license feature has no relation to the public
health;, safety or morals." It also contended that the bill is
discriminatory. No doubt what the complaint desires to assert
is that this act has no relation to the police power. But he has
failed to include one of the specific divisions included under the
police power, namely, that of the general welfare of the public,
which is probably as broad and general in its *scope as the other
three divisions combined. The chain store situation pertains
more directly to the general welfare of the people than does the
safety, health' or morals, although the former two may easily be
included therein. As to being discriminatory, th.is act perhaps will
meet with the same decision as did the bill in the North Carolina
case (supra).
Businesses, for t he purpose'of licensing, regulating and tax-
ing, have b~en classified and the classification upheld by several
of the States having enacted such legislation. Reasonable class-
ification of persons, property, occupations or businesses for the
purpose of license regulation or the imposition of license taxes is
not a yiolation of the guaranty of the equal. protection of the
.laws; but unreasonable and arbitrary discrimination renders the
statute or ordinance unconstitutional and void. See 12 C.J.
1155, 890. 'Legislation which affects one class and not another,
but which affects all members of the same class alike, is not.un-
constitutional as class legislat'ion. And by being a reaonable
classification does -not necessarily mean what is best. but what is
fairly appropriate to the purpose under all of the circumstances.
See Words and Phrases.
. In Wingfield, et al. Vs. South Carolina Tax Commissioner,
et al., 144 S.E. 846, the court in its opinion stated that 'subject'
to certain limitations and restrictions a State Legislature may
either in the exercise of the Police Power or for the purpose of
revenue require -license or impose license taxes on occupations
or privileges within the limits of the State when it deems them to
be warranted by a consideration of public interest and for the
general welfare. It has been held that legislative classification
for taxation may be founded, not ;only upon the nature of the
article sold, but upon the manner of conducting the business."
And in Heirs vs. Mitchell, 116 So. 81, a license fee was declared
not to be a tax within the meaning of the provisions of the or
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ganic law requiring uniformity of rates, etc-for the purpose of
taxation. See Cooley on Taxation, third addition, 392. "The
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police
powers, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion
in that regard, and it voids what is done only when it is without
any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary."
Under these decisions, what is to prevent State legislatures
from passing a law affecting the operation and maintenance of
chain stores? As the chains materially affect the public interest
and general welfare, the States could validly enact laws regu-
lating the same. The matter of conducting business as em-
ployed by the chain stores, is repulsive to the principles of legiti-
mate business and fair competition which thle giovernment has
endeavored to secure. Also, the general welfare of the public
is concerned with many products sold by these undesirable legal
entities which are the creation of a "big business" monopolistic
trust.
But for one exception, the records fail to disclose any of
these bills requiritig the chains to pay a license tax upon the
privilege of operating their stores, to have reached the United
States Supreme Co urt. The exception referred to is not a bill
directly aimed at the chain stores, but its ultimate effect has
to change the tide of this movement. An Act passed in 1927 by
the Pennsylvania Assembly prohibited ownership of any phar-
macy or drug store by any one other than a licensed pharmacist
with a saving of those lawfully engaged in such business at that
time. The constitutionality of this act was contested the same
year that it was passed in the case of Louis K. Liggett Co. vs.
Baldridge, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, et al, 22 Fed. 2d.
993.7 The basis of the decision as given by the Federal District
Court, appears to be on the firm and substantial ground that the
Act was passed with regard to the public interest and safe guard.
"-.-The Act of Assembly should be upheld," said the court,
"if the enactment has a substantial r.elation to the public interest.
7 F or comment and review of this case see 76 Penna. Law. Rev. 860.
The Federal District Court of Pennsylvania. however, was reversed by the
United States Supreme Court In 40 Sup. Ct. S7. See also, 4 N. D. Lawyer
39. In George Evans Inc. vs. Bfaldridge. 144 Atl. 97. the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania held the same act to be unconstitutional, awaiting for the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Liggett vs.
Baldridge, before it entered its final judgment.
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We take this to mean that, if there is such relation, the statute
cannot be found to be aft exercise of the arbitrary power of en-
croachment upon the personal liberty of any one affected by the
law, nor can it be said to be a like arbitrary exercise of the power
to take from any one his property."
The court, to a small extent, then considered the relation
which the act might bear to the public interest, stating that "it
may be the legislature thought a corporate owner in purchasing
drugs might give a greater regard to the price than to the qual-
ity; and, if such was the thought of the legislature, can this
court say it was without a valid connection with the public in-
terest and so unreasonable as to be unlawful? Because of our
inability to see where the instant act has no substahtial relation
to the public interest, we cannot hold it to be unconstitutional."
Consider the fact that the corporate owner would gjve greater
regard to the price .than to the quality. The reason -for such re-
strictions can be more eaily seen. in the merchandising of groc-
eries, clothing, furnitui-e, etc. Most monopolies are inconsid-
erate of their customers and monopolistic. tendencies may, for
that reason, be considered to be against the general welfare.
On an appeal of this case to the United States Supreme
Court, 49 Sup. Ct. 57, it was the opinion of the court that the
Pennsylvania Act had no real or substantial relation to the public
health and that such relation was necessary in order that the
police power may be exerted in the form of State Legislation;
that a "State cannot, under the guise of protecting the public.
arbitrarily interfere with private business or prohibit lawful
occupations or. impose unreasonable and unnecessary restric-
t1ons upon them."
Here there appears to be an inconsistency in the holdings
of the Supreme Court. Let us examine the case" of Mungler vs.
Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205. This de-
cision will be remembered as authority for declaring valid the
laws of the various states affecting the manufacture and selling
fo intoxicating liquors. It is stated that "society has the power
to ,protect itself by legislation against the injurious consequence
of that business.". (Referring to the liquor business)--"But by
Whom or by what authority is it to be. determined whether"
such business "will injuriously affect the public. - Under
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our system that power is lodged with the legislature branch of
the government-to exert what are known as the police powers
of the State and to determine primarily what measures are ap-
propriate--for the protection of the public morals, the public
health, or the public safety.-If a State deems the absolute pro-
hibition" of liquor "to be necessary to the peace and security bf
society, the courts cannot, without usurping legislative function
over-ride the will of the people, as they are expressed by their
chosen representativet. They will have nothing to do with the
mere policy of legislation."
True, the court states there must be a substantial relation
to the public health, but wherein has the court the power to say
when this relation does exist? In the Mungler case it was held
that the courts could not over-ride the will of t6ie people as ex-
pressed by their representatives. This is what the Federal Su-
preme Court, in reality, actually did do in'the Liggett case.
"It is not necessary," said the court in State of Louisiana vs.
City of New Orleans, 97 So. 440, 33 A.L.R. 260. "for the validity
of the ordinances (speaking of zoning ordinances) in question
that we should deem the ordinances justified by consideration
of public health, safeiy, comfort, or the general welfare. It is
sufficient that the city council, (the legislative function of a
municipality) could reasonably have had such consideration in
mind. If. such consideration could have justified the ordinance,
we must assume that they did justify them." Again, it is seen
that it is #or the legislative function acting under the police
power to decide what is needed for the public health, safety,
morals and general welfare.
Justice Holmes, in which Brandies concurred, wrote a dis-
senting opinion to the Liggett case (supra) in which he stated
that he. "thought, however, that the police power, as'that term
has been defined and explained, clearly extends to a law like
this."
Under what circumstances were the prohibition laws en-
acted? A minority favoring this law enactment caused a large
quantity of propaganda to be circulated, whereby public" senti-
ment was aroused in their favor. This was carried to the repre-
sentatives through the medium of lobbyists, who succeeded in
placing such laws before the law-makers. When the law was
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brought before the courts to determine the constitutionality, the
courts invoked the police power, being of the opinion that as it
was what they, the people, desired, it was for their benefit and
general welfare.8
In this same manner the public must be educated concern-
ing the methods employed by the chain stores; how the chains
employ deceptive methods whereby the public is tricked into be-
lieving they ar6 getting standard quality as well as quantity mer-
chandise; how the chains could eventually demoralize a commun-
ity, and perhaps an entire state, in that their entire receipts are
sent from out the community, and most times the state, expend-
ing therein only that necessary for their operation, namely, for
employees wages, taxes and renting or leasing of property.
As we have seen, strictly speaking, the Federal Government
has no police power. But, because it is not custodian qf the pub-
lic general welfare, is there'no other method of attack whereby
this centralized national government of the American populace
can reach the stronghold of the chain store movement with its
rapidly increasing trend towards monoply and trust? Surely
there is, and that is thru the channels of the Federal Trade Com-
mission, which body should invoke, *without further delay, the
Federal Anti-Trust Laws. Especially applicable to the present
situation, as described in the first part of this article should be
the Shermai Anti-Trust Act of 1899 and its succeeding enact-
ment, the Clayton Act of 1914. Of course, it must be borne in
mind that these acts apply only to Interstate Commerce, as the
Federal Government is limited in its control over that commerce
which is carried on between the several states. The chain stores,
however, could never conceive the idea that they were not with-
in the Interstate Commerce power of the Federal Government,
as they have not only achieved a national, but as well, an inter-
national aspect.
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, Sec. 8820 of the United
States statutes states that "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several states-is hereby declared to be
s An analagous crse is that of lottery tickets. Some of the earliordecisions denied that lottery .contracts could be impaired by subsequentlegislation. Kellum v. State, 66 Ind. at 597; Gregory v, Trustees, 2 Mitc(Ky.) 589. But in Stone v. iississippi, 101 U. S, 814. 25 L, Ed, 1079, a
state law Impairing such lottery tickets was upheld as lotteries weredeclardd to be against Public morals and the general welfare.
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illegal-" This act was designated as "An Act to protect trade
and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies." Mr.
Montgomery, in his Financial Hand Book,9 1388, summarizes
this Act as forbidding "All unreasonable restraint of trade by
declaring illegal: 1, every contract, combination or conspiracy
between two oK more parties which directly restrains interstate
trade or commerce; 2, every act of a person -which shall monop-
olize or tend to monopolize the trade of the several states."
From the expressed trems of the Act, the purpose and
reason for the enactment can be easily seen. The United States
Supreme Court in United State vs. Standard Oil Company, 31
Sup. Ct. 502, 221 U. S. 1, 55 L. Ed. 619, 34 L. R .A. (N. S.) 834,
commencing upon the purpose of the Sherman Act stated that
such was "to prevent the stifling and the substantial restriction
of competition in interstate and foreign commerce, and to keep
the prices of articles and such commerce open to free competi-
tion, and any contract or combination of two or more parties
whereby the control of prices is taken from separate competitors
in the trades, and vested in a person or in an association of
persons, restricts competition and restrains commerce."
The test of the validity of a contract. cbmbination or con-
spiracy challenged under the 'Federal Anti-Trust Act, is the
direct effect of such a contract or combination upon competition
in commerce among the States. If its necessary effect is to stifle
competition or directly and substantially to restrict it, is void.
64 L. R. A. Note 689.
The question is-does it impose any restraint whatever? If
it does, no matter how little or reasonable it may be, it is within
the prohibition. Its provisions make it unlawful to monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, any part of the trade or commerce
among the several states.
Apply the terms of the Sherman Act to several of the
gigantic chains now in existence, taking for example the Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company or the Kroger Grocery & Bak-
ing Co. Both of these corporations have been contented, not
with cutting price from merchandise they offer to thoe con-
sumer, but they have purchased outright large canneries, bak-
9 See "Financial Handbook" by R. H. Montgomery, section 27, Federal
Regulation of Business. page 1388. for a summary of the Federal Laws
affecting Interstate trade or commerce and an expianation of their terms
with cases there cited.
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eries, packing establishments, etc., as well as having controlling
stock in many others, which no doubt, they will eventually
amalgamate if not estopped by the Federal Trade Commission."
What is to prevent either one of these companies from effecting
a super-monopoly of the commodities which they offer for sale?
Nothing. By the terms of the Sherman Act. we have seen that
any act of a person which, not necessarily is a monopoly, but
that which tends to monopolize the trade of the several states,
is illegal. See Standard Oil Co. vs. United States, 221 U. S. 1.
The next point to consider is whether such monopoly )Dr
tendency towards monopoly, is an unreasonable restraint of
trade. Little time need be spent here as in the case of Board of
Trade of Chicago vs. United States, 246 U. S. 231, the court held
the final test whether or not an act is an unreasonable restraint is
determined by the intent of the parties and the nature of the
act which, if it has within it the power to suppress competition.
is viewed as an act in restraint of trade. How can it be said that
the nature of the acts of chain corporations is not to suppress
competition? In c.ase they encounter competition they at once
proceed to buy the company, or stores, thus eliminating as much
competition as possible. This is borne out through the purchase
of some ten chains by the Kroger Corporation during the past
year. The chain organization admit -they already have elimi-
nated the independent store competition, and. that the compe-
tition is now between the chains, themselves.
And reasonableness of a restraint is determined largely by
the effect of the restraint. The affect must be on the public in
general rather than -on an individual. United States vs. D. L. &
V. R. R. Co., 238 U. S. 516. Surely it cannot be said that the
effect of the chain stores is upon the individual only, as an indi-
vidual store operator, but rather is upon the public in general,
as it is its welfare that is being ururped. Then again, it is main-
tained that any restrictions tending to suppress competition and
preventing trades from transacting their business in their usual
manner is an injury to the trader and to the public.
10 Evans Clark states that the Whalan-Schulte combine, working
in close co-operation, jointly own the Union Tobacco Company, which
owns ten manufacturing concerns; the Schulte-United 5c to $1 stores
dealing in general merchandise; control the United Retail Chemists Cor-poration with a substantial interest in the Happiness Candles and Life
Savers Inc.; and interest in the DJer-Kiss perfumery company as well
ars restaurants, lunch shops and grocery concerns.
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Also, reasonableness of the restraint may be connected with
the methods of trade. It has been held that where control was
acquired by the usual and fair methods of business, in open com-
petition, such monoplistic acquisition was valid. On the con-
trary, however, the use of unfair methods of business constitute
unfair methods of competition, as for example, the practice with
the intent of misleading and confusing the trade and the public
as to what it is actually ,purchasing. Unfair methods of busi-
ness have been divided into two classes-those which offend
good morals, such as fraud, deception, bad faith, etc., and those
having a tendency to limit competition, tend towards monopoly,
or are against public policy. In this article we are not prepared
to discuss the former division, but it has been proven that the
chains employ methods offensive to good morals. However,
these corporations should clearly come within the latter division.
As we have seen, limitation is placed upon competition and they
tend towards monopoly, if not in fact, at the present time, a
monopoly, in that anything tending to destroy competition tends
toward monopoly -The chains are against public policy in that
they are a potential, economic menace. Although it has been
stated that the chain store is the ideal method of economic dis-
tribution, chains tend towards destruction of sound, edonomic
principles, namely, that all persons should have an equal op-
portunity to participate in their desired field of endeavor; and
the chains prevent the working of this principle.
To this point we have been dealing solely with the Sherman
Act. This Act was supplemented by the Clayton Act of 1914 by
regulating trade practice not .dwelt with in the Sherman Act.
The outstanding development of this act was that it regulated
price discrimination stating that "It shall be unlawful for any
p erson engaged in commerce-either directly or indirectly, to
discriminate in price between different purchasers of commod-
ities-where the effect of such discrimination may be to substan-
tially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce." Sec. 8835 b. U. S. Statutes. This ast has
been the subject of much litigation in that it prohibits the fixing
of a definite re-sale price whereby the manufacturers contract
with the jobbers or the retailers, not to resell their articles at less
than the price so set by the manufacturer. The United States
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oupreme Court has held in ll %,cases. wLiL %IL XLV.u Lhis .- j-
osition ,that maintaining of resale price was invalid under the
terms of the Federal Anti-Trust Laws. This court declares that
competition is suppressed because the buyers agree not to sell
below the price. United States vs. Schrader's Son, Inc., 64 L.
Ed, 471; Frey & Son, Inc. vs. Cudahay Packing Co., 65 L. Ed.
892; Boston Store of Chicago vs. American Graphaphone Co., 62
L. Ed. 551; Butterick Co. et al vs. Federal Trade Commission,
4 Fed. 2d 910. In J. W. Nobi Co. vs. Federal Trade Commission,
22 Fed. 2d 41, the District Court declared in its opinion that
'the basis of the condemnation of the resale price fixing- is the
elimination of competition as represented by the prices among
distributors of a product on which the resale prices were o fixed,
and it has the danger of a distinct monopolistic effect."
The Federal Trade Commission has been conducting an in-
vestigation concerning price resale maintenance and have failed
'to report favorably concerning legislation declaring such acts
valid. Mr. Flynn, (supra) states that the independents are de-
sirous of having Congress pass an Act whereby it would be lawful
for'the manufacturer to contract with the buyer upon the stipu-
lation not to resell below the price fixed. He maintains that
if such a bill were passed, the chain stores, because of being
forced to discontinue selling at cut prices, would be benefitted
and cdmpelled to take the larger 1rofits which they had been
giving the public the-benefit of; that they would continue to op-
erate as cheaply and would not be permitted to give the public
the benefit of their supposedly efficient operation and manage-
ment.
Nevertheless, there may be severaL points in lavor of amend-
ing the Trust Laws in this respect. By being permitted to con-
tract for price resale maintenance, the chains would be compelled
to sell standard, quality, nationally advertised commodities at
the same identical price as would 'be the independents. The
chains thereby, would lose their "leaders" and the independents
would be given an equal chance to compete against the "power"
establishments. !We have seen in the above that the chains are
enabled to place the merchandise at the disposal of the consumer
with but a 2 per cent advantage over their competitors, if we may
so term the independent stores. Whereby their profits on the
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"leaders" are not going to be much greater, because at the same
time they are going to sell. considerably less merchandise than if
permitted to cut the price.. Nearly two-thirds of these answering
an inquiry made by the Federal Trade Commission concerning
this subject stated they were of the opinion that such a bill wouk
handicap chain stores, or at least eliminate some of the advan-
tages they now enjoy.11
What is to prevent one of these chains from combining and
merging the entire field of chain stores into one giant super-
trust? Clark, in his article, (supra) mentions that E. A. Filene
predicts a super-trust serving the entire nation with every con-
ceivable kind of merchandise. The Federal Trade Commission
is, at the present time, conducting an investigation of competi-
tive conditions and consolidations among chain store organiza-
tions in order to ascertain whether or not the Anti-Trust laws
have been violated. If the Commission fails to report that the
Federal Anti-trust laws have been violated by the chains, why
should not this commission be estopped fxom bringing any simi-
lar action when a super-chain, super-trust does appear? The Fed-
eral Courts have not been confronted with this question, but
they, too, should be estopped if they found no trust existing in
the restraint of competition of trade and commerce. Such a
super-trust super-chain may seem very improbable, but in reality
it is not. And when this situation makes its appearance, which
can be but a short time hence, at the rate the larger chains have
been absorbing thru merger the smaller chains, the government
will be compelled to intercede and control and regulate the same
as the public utilities are regulated at the present day. And if
the government must assume control and regulation it (the
government) will take upon itself a complex of a socialistic state.
which indeed is contrary to the principles and high aims of our
nation's founders.
"It is better," said Clark, (supra), "at least from an econom-
ic point of view-to be an employe-manager of one link in a
chain-than the harried monarch of a precarious business of
your own." This is a dangerous doctrine. The .business of this
country has changed from an individual complex to one 6f' a
11 For a complete report of the Federal Trade Commission's .investi-
gation concerning price resale maintenance see Part One of that body's
official United States report.
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collective complex, and it is this collective complex which will
bring about an unpreven'tive socialistic state. The public appear
as being desirous of having the government regulate their very
livelihood. Some may not desire this, but the present chain situ-
ation may force it upon them. It is time that the people awlake
to the happenings about them, think for themselves, and once
again assume an individual complex which is necessary, to a
large extent, for the expediency of a lasting national govern-
ment.
